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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/SDM-9100A
02-4F-032001-I
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECHISDM
9100
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-501
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/SDM-9100
02-4F-032001-3
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/SDM
9100
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] IN] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-502
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/SDM-9101A
02-4F-032001-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/SDM
9101
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
H. J. LOWERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[ F ]
[P]
[N]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
A
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-503
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS ¥STEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
MECH/SDM-9101
02-4F-032001-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_ [ X ]
MECH/SDM
9101
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
H. J. LOWERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
A B
[F] [F]
[P] [P]
IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOAANAL¥SES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-504
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9100B
NASA FMEA #: 02-4F-032001-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/SDM
9100
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
CO.ARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-505
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/PBR-6211
02-4G-151-2
MECH/PBR
6211
DEPLOYMENT TORQUE SHAFT
W.T. SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C ] C ]
[P] CP]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. SEE MDAC ID 6211 FOR EFFECTS AND
RATIONALE.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-506
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/PBR-6212
02-4G-151-2
MECHIPBR
6212
DEPLOYMENT ROTARY ACTUATOR
W.T. SLAUGHTER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. SEE MDAC ID 6211 FOR EFFECTS AND
RATIONALE.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-507
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
MECH/PBR-6212A
02-4G-151-3
MECH/PBR
6212
DEPLOYMENT ROTARY ACTUATOR
W. T ° SLAUGHTER
NASA [ 1 /i ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.
ix]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-508
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-16513X
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-152-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
16513
LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL. SEE RELATED MDAC ID 6213.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-509
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/PBR-6213
02-4G-152-3
MECH/PBR
6213
DEPLOYMENT CRANK AND LINK
W.T. SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH FMEA/CIL.
FOR STRUCTURAL FAILURE OTHER THAN BINDING/JAMMING LINKAGE WOULD
PROBABLY BE BROKEN/DISCONNECTED IN A "FAILS FREE" MODE. IN THIS
CASE REMAINING ACTUATOR/CRANK SHOULD DRIVE THE PANEL TO THE STOW
STATE.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-510
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MECH/PBR-6201
02-4G-153-I
MECH/PBR
6201
MOTOR
W.T. SLAUGHTER
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.
IX]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-511
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6203
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-153-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6203
ITEM: MOTOR BRAKE
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA
IOA
A
[2/IR] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]
B C
[F] [P]
[ ] [ ]
IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-512
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6207
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-154-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6207
ITEM: GEARBOX
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ x] •
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-513
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/PBR-6208
02-4G-154-3
MECH/PBa
6208
GEARBOX
W. T. SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[p] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-514
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/PBR-6205
02-4G-155-I
MECH/PBR
6205
TORQUE LIMITER
W.T. SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ 1 [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-515
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6204
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-155-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
6204
TORQUE LIMITER
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-516
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6301
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-156-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
6301
HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-517
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6302
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-156-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
6302
HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-518
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-16511X
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-157-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
16511
BEARING, TORQUE SHAFT SUPPORT
LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-519
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/PBR-6211A
02-4G-158-I
ME_/PSR
6211
DEPLOYMENT TORQUE SHAFT
W. T • SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-520
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6113
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-176-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
6113
LATCH HOOK MECHANISM
LEAD ANALYST: WoT. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH FMEA/CIL.
WORSE CASE FAILURE WOULD BE LOSS OF ABILITY TO RELEASE/LATCH A
LATCH PAIR. THIS WILL NOT AFFECT MISSION CONTINUANCE AND SHOULD
BE CRITICALITY THREE (3).
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-521
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
MECH/PBR-6 i03
02-4G-179-2
MECH/PBR
6103
MOTOR BRAKE
W.T. SLAUGHTER
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
CN]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-522
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6107
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-180-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6107
ITEM: GEARBOX
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ]
B C
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 1 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-523
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/PBR-6108
02-4G-180-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6108
ITEM: GEARBOX
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
W.T. SLAUGHTER
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[p]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-524
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6111
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-181-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
6111
LATCH TORQUE SHAFT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-525
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/PBR-6112
02-4G-181-2
MECH/PBR
6112
LATCH ROTARY ACTUATOR
W.T. SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH FMEA/CIL.
SHOULD BE A CRITICALITY THREE (3) AS THE LOSS OF ABILITY TO LATCH
A SINGLE LATCH PAIR SHOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION CONTINUANCE.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-526
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6 II2A
NASA FMEA # : 02-4G-182-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
6112
LATCH ROTARY ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST : W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IX] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REC
* C
REM
IOA
SHO
AS
_S: (If different from NASA)
/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ON RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
KGREE WITH FMEA/CIL.
RITICALITY THREE (3) AS THE LOSS OF ABILITY TO LATCH
H PAIR SHOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION CONTINUANCE.
REp 3/07/88 C-527
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6105
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-183-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
6105
TORQUE LIMITER
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH FMEA/CIL.
FAILURE TO ENGAGE OF OUR TORQUE LIMITER RESULTS IN LOSS OF ROTARY
INPUT OF ONE DRIVE MOTOR. OTHER DRIVE MOTOR SHOULD EFFECT
RELEASE/LATCH STATE IN SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME. SHOULD BE A
CRITICALITY THREE (3) AS MISSION CONTINUANCE NOT AFFECTED.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-528
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASS_
ASSI
NAS_
SUB.'
MDA_
ITF2
LEAJ
ASSZ
COM
?E: 2/19/88
: MECH/PBR-6104
02-4G-183-2
MECH/PBR
6104
TORQUE LIMITER
W.T. SLAUGHTER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CALITY
,IGHT
_FUNC
/IR ]
/3 ]
/N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ F ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
CN] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
REE )NS: (If different from NASA)
/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* ( ION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
RE]
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-529
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/PBR-16514X
02-4G-184-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBR
16514
ROLLER ASSEMBLY LATCH RADIATOR
W. SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-530
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/PBR-6302A
02-4G-186-I
MECH/PBR
6302
HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS
W.T. SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
ix]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-531
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-16512X
NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-301-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR
16512
SWITCH MODULE, LIMIT, RADIATOR STOWED
LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX].
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
IX]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-532
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6501
NASA FMEA #: 05-65G-2001-01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR/EPD&C
6501
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6502,
6503, 6504.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-533
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6502
NASA FMEA #: 05-65G-2001-01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR/EPD&C
6502
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6501,
6503, 6504.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-534
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6503
NASA FMEA #: 05-65G-2001-01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR/EPD&C
6503
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6501,
6502, 6504.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-535
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/PBR-6504
NASA FMEA #: 05-65G-2001-01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR/EPD&C
6504
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6501,
6502, 6503.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-536
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/VDM-8107D
05-6AB-2026A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8107
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-537
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8108D
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2026A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM
8108
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-538
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmc
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/VDM-8502D
05-6AB-2026A-2
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8502
ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[p]
[ ]
B
[P]
[ NA]
IN]
C
[p]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-539
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/VDM-8107A
05-6AB-2027-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8107
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-540
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8108A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2027-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM
8108
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-541
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8502A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2027-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8502
ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ N ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-542
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8107B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2028
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8107
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-543
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8108B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2028
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM
8108
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-544
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/VDM-8502B
05-6AB-2028
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8502
ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE
M. BRADWAY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-545
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/VDM-8107C
05-6AB-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8107
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-546
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8108C
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM
8108
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTILRESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-547
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8502C
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8502
ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWA¥
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-548
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FME #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/VDM-8107E
05-6AB-2030A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8107
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-549
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8108E
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2030A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM
8108
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
NDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-550
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/VDM-8502E
05-6AB-2030A-2
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8502
ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[ P3
[ ]
B
[P]
[ NA]
IN]
C
[p]
[e]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-551
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8107
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2031A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM
8107
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-552
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8108
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2031A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECHIVDM
8108
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HOWlnmC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ I ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOAANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-553
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8502
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2031A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8502
ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-554
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/VDM-8503
05-6AB-2126-2
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8503
MCAAC POWER RELAY
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[P]
[ ]
B
[ P ]
[ NA]
[ N ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-555
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8503 B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2128-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8503
MCA AC POWER RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-556
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOa [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/VDM-8503C
05-6AB-2129-2
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8503
MCAAC POWER RELAY
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[P]
[ NA]
IN]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-557
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/VDM-8503D
05-6AB-2130-I
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8503
MCAAC POWER RELAY
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[P]
[ NA]
[N]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-558
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8503E
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2130-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8503
MCA AC POWER RELAY
LEAD ANALYST : M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-559
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/VDM-8503J
05-6AB-2133-2
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8503
MCA AC POWER RELAY
M. BRADWAY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-560
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/VDM-8503F
05-6AB-2134-2
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8503
MCA AC POWER RELAY
M. BRADWA¥
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[p]
[ ]
B
[P]
[ NA]
[ N ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-561
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8503G
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2135-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8503
MCA AC POWER RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / 3 [ ] [ N 3 [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-562
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8503H
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2138-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8503
MCAAC POWER RELAY
LEAD ANALYST : M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-563
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/VDM-8503I
05-6AB-2139-2
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8503
MCA AC POWER RELAY
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[P]
[ ]
B
[P]
[ NA]
IN]
C
CP]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-564
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/VDM-8503A
05-6AB-2177-I
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8503
MCAAC POWER RELAY
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[p]
[ NA]
IN]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-565
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8511A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2201-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8511
MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR (2)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-566
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/VDM-8512A
05-6AB-2201-2
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8512
MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[F]
[ NA]
[N]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-567
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/F_r.c
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/VDM-8513A
05-6AB-2201-2
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8513
GPC SOFTWARE
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[p]
[P]
[ ]
B
IF]
[ NA]
[ N ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-568
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/VDM-8517A
05-6AB-2201-2
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8517
GPC SOFTWARE
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[P]
[P]
[ ]
B
IF]
[ NA]
[ N ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOAANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-569
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
MECH/VDM-8511
05-6AB-2202-2
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8511
MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR (2)
M. BRADWA¥
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If appllcable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-570
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8512
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2202-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8512
MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / 3 [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-571
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8513
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2202-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8513
GPC SOFTWARE
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-572
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
_ESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
_ESSMENT ID:
_A FME #:
3SYSTEM:
_C ID:
_M:
_D ANALYST :
3ESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
MECH/VDM- 8517
05-6AB-2202-2
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8517
GPC SOFTWARE
M. BRADWAY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
MPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
:MARKS:
,A AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[E DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
: AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
O_AL PA_E IS
OF PO0_ QUALFI'y
]PORT DATE 03/07/88 C-573
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8511B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2204-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8511
MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR (2)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-574
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/VDM-8512B
05-6AB-2204-2
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8512
MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
CP]
[P]
C ]
B
IF]
[ NA]
IN]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ClL
ITEM
[x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-575
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8513B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2204-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECHIVDMIEPD&C
8513
GPC SOFTWARE
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C N ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMAR/(S:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-576
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8517B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2204-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM •
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8517
GPC SOFTWARE
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWA¥
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-577
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8507
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2252-I
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8507
MCA DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-578
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8508
NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2252-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8508
MCA DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-579
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5502
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EB-2000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5502
CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-580
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5504
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EB-2001-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANAL¥ST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5504
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CONTROL SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-581
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5504A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EB-2001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5504
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-582
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/PBD-5507
05-6EB-2004-I
MECH/PBD_EPD&C
5507
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
J. BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[P]
[ ]
B
[P]
IF]
IN]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-583
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
MECH/PBD-5507A
05-6EB-2004-2
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5507
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
J. BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-584
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/PBD-5508
05-6EB-2004-2
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5508
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-585
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5507B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EB-2005-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5507
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-586
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5508A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EB-2005-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5508
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-587
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/PBD-5507C
05-6EB-2005-2
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5507
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
J. BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
B
[P]
[ F ]
[N]
C
[P]
CP]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-588
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/PBD-5508B
05-6EB-2005-2
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5508
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
J. BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
IN] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-589
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
MECH/PBD-5504B
05-6EB-2010-I
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5504
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CONTROL SWITCH
J. BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-590
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
MECH/PBD-5504C
05-6EB-2010-2
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5504
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CONTROL SWITCH
J. BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-591
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5505
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EB-2011-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5505
FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-592
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETU-3505
05-6ED-2026-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3505
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
IN] IN]
C
[p]
[ ]
IN]
J. BACHER
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-593
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ETU-3506
05-6ED-2026-3
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3506
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] C ] C ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-594
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3505A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2026-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3505
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
C ] C ] [ ]
CN] CN] CN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-595
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3506A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2026-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3506
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-596
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ETU-3507
05-6ED-2027-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3507
CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
CP] CP]
[ ] C ]
c
[p]
[ P]
[ ]
J. BACHER
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-597
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ETU-3508
05-6ED-2027-2
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3508
CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
CP] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-598
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ETU-3507A
05-6ED-2027-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3507
CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
J. BACHER
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IX]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-599
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETU-3508A
05-6ED-2027-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3508
CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
IN]
J. BACHER
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-600
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ETU-3509
05-6ED-2028-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3509
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-601
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETU-3510
05-6ED-2028-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3510
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
C ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-602
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3509A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2030-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3509
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-603
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETU-3510A
05-6ED-2030-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3510
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] IN] IN]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-604
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3501G
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2126-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3501
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-605
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ETU-3503E
05-6ED-2126-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3503
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOk [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-606
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3501
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2127-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3501
ITEM: RE LAY
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-607
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ETU-3502
05-6ED-2127-I
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3502
RELAY
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[X]*
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-608
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3501A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2127-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3501
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST : J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT :
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-609
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3502A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2127-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3502
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-610
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ETU-3501B
05-6ED-2129-I
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3501
RELAY
J. BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[P]
[F]
[N]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-611
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRI TI CALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ETU-3503
05-6ED-2129-I
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3503
RELAY
J. BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[P]
[P]
[ ]
B
[P]
[F]
[N]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-612
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ETU-3501C
05-6ED-2130-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3501
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-613
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ETU-3503A
05-6ED-2130-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3503
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C I ] C ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-614
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
.DW/nmc
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ETU-3501D
05-6ED-2131-I
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3501
RELAY
Jo BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[P]
[p]
[ ]
B
[P]
[F]
[ N ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-615
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3503B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2131-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3503
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-616
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ETU-3501E
05-6ED-2131-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3501
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-617
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3503C
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2131-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3503
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C N ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-618
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ETU-3501F
05-6ED-2132-2
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3501
RELAY
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / ] c ] C ] [ ] C J
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-619
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ETU-3503D
05-6ED-2132-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3503
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDWlFUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-620
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMP_ [ N / ]
MECH/ETU-3522
05-6ED-2250-I
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3522
DIODE
J. BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[F]
[ N ]
B
[ F ]
IF]
[ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-621
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
MECH/ETU-3522E
05-6ED-2251A-I
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3522
DIODE
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-622
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3523G
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2251A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3523
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-623
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ETU-3522F
05-6ED-2251A-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3522
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ Y ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-624
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETU-3523H
05-6ED-2251A-2
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3523
DIODE
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] C ] C ]
IN] [N] [N]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-625
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
MECR/ETU-3522C
OS-_ED-22S18-2
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3522
DIODE
J. BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[F] [F]
[F] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
C p ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-626
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ETU-3523E
05-6ED-2251B-2
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3523
DIODE
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CN] CN] IN]
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-627
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ETU- 3522A
05-6ED-2252-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3522
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-628
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ETU-3523C
05-6ED-2252-2
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3523
DIODE
J. BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
IN] IN]
C
[P]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEMMANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-629
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3522D
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2252B-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3522
ITEM: DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-630
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ETU-3523F
05-6ED-2252B-2
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3523
DIODE
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
IX] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-631
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ETU-3523
05-6ED-2252C-2
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3523
DIODE
J. BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
IN] IN]
C
[p]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-632
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ETU-3523A
05-6ED-2255-2
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3523
DIODE
J. BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[P] [F]
C ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
CP]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-633
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
MECH/ETU-3522B
05-6ED-2257-2
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3522
DIODE
J. BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[P]
IF]
[N]
B
IF]
IF]
[ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-634
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ETU-3523D
05-6ED-2257-2
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3523
DIODE
J. BACHER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC a B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-635
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ETU-3523B
05-6ED-2257A-2
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3523
DIODE
J. BACHER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] IN]
C
[P]
C ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOAANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEMMANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-636
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-II700X
05-6EE-2001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
11700
FUSE (IA) MOTOR POWER CONTROL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[p] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
M. BRADWAY
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-637
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1500A
NASA FMEA # : 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1500
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-638
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1501A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1501
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-639
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1502A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1502
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-640
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1503A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1503
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-641
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1504A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1504
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-642
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1505A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1505
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A. D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-643
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1506A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1506
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-644
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1507A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1507
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-645
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1508A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1508
+28V CONTACT #1
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-646
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1509A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1509
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-647
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1510A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1510
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-648
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1511A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1511
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-649
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1512A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1512
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-650
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1513A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1513
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ i /i ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA C 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] C P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-651
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1514A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1514
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTIONREQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-652
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1515A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1515
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-653
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1516A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1516
+28V CONTACT #I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAII//RE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-654
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1517A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1517
+28V CONTACT #1
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-655
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP-1518A
05-6EE-2002-1
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1518
+28V CONTACT #2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
IN] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAII//RE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-656
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /1 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ S /N ]
MECH/ADP-1519A
05-6EE-2002-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1519
+28V CONTACT #2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
C ] C ] [
[ ] C ] C
C ] C ] C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [x]*
] IX]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-657
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1520A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1520
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-658
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1521A
NASA FME #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1521
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 IIR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-659
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1522A
NASA FMEA # : 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1522
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-660
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1523A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1523
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-661
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1532A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1532
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-662
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1533A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1534
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-663
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1534A
NASA FME #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1534
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
N_A [i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-664
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1535A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1535
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-665
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1536A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1536
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-666
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1537A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1537
+28V CONTACT _3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
Nm, [ x ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTIONREQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-667
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP-1538A
05-6EE-2002-1
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1538
+28V CONTACT #4
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-668
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1539A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1539
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-669
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1540A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1540
+28V CONTACT #1
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-670
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1541A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1541
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-671
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1542A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1542
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-672
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1543A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1543
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-673
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1544A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1544
+28V CONTACT #3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-674
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1545A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1545
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT :
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-675
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1546A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1546
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-676
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1547A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1547
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-677
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1548A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1548
+28V CONTACT #i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-678
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1549A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1549
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-679
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1550A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1550
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-680
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1551A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1551
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-681
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1552A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1552
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-682
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1553A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1553
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-683
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1554A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1554
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT :
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-684
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1555A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1555
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-685
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1500
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NECH/ADP/EPD&C
1500
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-686
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1501
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1501
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-687
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1502
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1502
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-688
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1503
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1503
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-689
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1504
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1504
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-690
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1505
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1505
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [I/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-691
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1506
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1506
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-692
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1507
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1507
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-693 <
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1508
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1508
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-694
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1509
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1509
+28V CONTACT #1
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-695
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1510
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1510
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CILRETENTIONRATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTIONREQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-696
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1511
NASA FMEA # : 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1511
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-697
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1512
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1512
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-698
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1513
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1513
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-699
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1514
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1514
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-700
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1515
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1515
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-701
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1516
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1516
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-702
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1517
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1517
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-703
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP- 1518
05- 6EE-2002-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1518
+28V CONTACT #2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-704
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1519
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1519
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-705
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1520
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1520
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ i /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] C ]
C P ] [ F ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-706
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1521
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1521
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-707
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1522
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1522
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-708
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1523
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1523
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-709
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1532
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1532
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-710
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1533
05-6EE-2002-2
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1533
+28V CONTACT #I
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
CP] CF] [P]
CN] CN] CN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] C p ] [ F ] [ P ] C A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-711
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1534
NASA FMEA # : 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1534
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-712
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1535
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1535
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-713
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1536
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1536
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] C N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-714
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1537
NASA FMEA # : 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1537
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-715
gAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1538
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID-
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1538
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-716
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1539
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1539
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-717
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1540
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1540
+28V CONTACT #1
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-718
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1541
NASA FMEA # : 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1541
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-719
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1542
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1542
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-720
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1543
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1543
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A 8 C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-721
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP- 1544
05-6EE-2002-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1544
+28V CONTACT #3
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-722
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1545
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1545
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ _ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-723
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1546
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1546
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-724
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1547
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1547
+28V CONTACT #4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-725
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1548
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1548
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-726
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1549
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1549
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-727
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1550
NASA FMEA # : 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1550
+28V CONTACT #2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-728
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1551
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1551
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ I /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-729
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1552
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NECH/ADP/EPD&C
1552
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-730
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1553
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1553
+28V CONTACT #3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-731
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1554
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1554
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [F] [P]
[N] [N] [N]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-732
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1555
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1555
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-733
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1524A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM"
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1524
+28V CONTACT #1
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-734
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1525A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_ [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1525
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-735
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1526A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1526
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COXPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-736
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1527A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1527
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-737
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1528A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID"
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1528
CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-738
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1529A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1529
ITEM: CONTACT #i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-739
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1530A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1530
CONTACT #2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-740
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1531A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1531
CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-741
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1524B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1524
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-742
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1525B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1525
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSES SMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-743
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1526B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1526
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-744
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/ADP-1527B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1527
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-745
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1528B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1528
CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
CP] CP] CP]
C ] [ ] C ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-746
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1529B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPDaC
1529
CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST" A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-747
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1530B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1530
CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[X]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-748
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1531B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1531
CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-749
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1524
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1524
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-750
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1525
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1525
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-751
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1526
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1526
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-752
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1527
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1527
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT :
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] C x ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-753
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1528
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1528
CONTACT #i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-754
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1529
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1529
CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAII//RE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-755
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1530
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1530
CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-756
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1531
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1531
CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-757
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1565
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2004-1
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1565
INVERTED AND GATE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-758
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-1567
05-6EE-2004-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1567
INVERTED AND GATE
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[p]
[P]
[ ]
B
[P]
[ F ]
IN]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-759
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1573
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2004-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1573
RELAY DRIVER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-760
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1575
05-6EE-2004-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1575
RELAY DRIVER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-761
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ME_/ADP-1581
05-6EE-2004-1
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1581
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-762
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ADP-1583
05-6EE-2004-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1583
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-763
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1564
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2004-2
SUBS ¥STEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1564
INVERTED AND GATE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /ZR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-764
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/13/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-1566
05-6EE-2004-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1566
INVERTED AND GATE
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[P]
[ ]
B
[P]
[ F ]
[N]
C
CP]
C P ]
C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-765
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/13/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1572
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2004-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1572
RELAY DRIVER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-766
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1574
05-6EE-2004-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1574
RELAY DRIVER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-767
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1580
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2004-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1580
ITEM: RELAY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-768
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
_DW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-1582
05-6EE-2004-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1582
RELAY
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[P]
[ ]
B
[P]
IF]
IN]
C
[p]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-769
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-1569
05-6EE-2005-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1569
INVERTED AND GATE
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B
[ ] [
[ ] [
[ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[313 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-770
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
MECH/ADP-1571
05-6EE-2005-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1571
INVERTED AND GATE
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-771
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1577
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2005-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1577
RELAY DRIVER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ 3 [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
3 C ] *
3 [ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-772
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1579
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2005-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1579
RELAY DRIVER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COXPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ 3 [ 3 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-773
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1585
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2005-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1585
ITEM: RELAY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-774
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/14/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ADP-1587
05-6EE-2005-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1587
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3 / 3 3 C ] C 3 C 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-775
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1568
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2005-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1568
INVERTED AND GATE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-776
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1570
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2005-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1570
INVERTED AND GATE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ 3 [ N ] [ 3 [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-777
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1576
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2005-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1576
RELAY DRIVER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-778
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1578
05-6EE-2005-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1578
RELAY DRIVER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-779
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1584
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2005-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1584
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-780
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-1586
05-6EE-2005-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1586
RELAY
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[p]
[P]
[ ]
B
[P]
[F]
[N]
C
CP]
C P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[S]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-781
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-I1701X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2006-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
11701
RESISTOR
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-782
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-11702X
05-6EE-2007-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
11702
RESISTOR
M. BRADWAY
A
[
[
[
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
[ 1 [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-783
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-11703X
05-6EE-2008-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
11703
DIODE
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
CP]
CN]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-784
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-11704X
05-6EE-2008-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
11704
DIODE
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-785
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-11705X
05-6EE-2009-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
11705
DIODE
M. BRADWAY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-786
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-II706X
05-6EE-2009-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
11706
DIODE
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-787
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-11707X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2012-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 11707
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]
[N] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ 1
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-788
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-II708X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2012-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 11708
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
P_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-789
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1628
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1628
POWER SUPPLY TEST AMP
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
c
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-790
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1629
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1629
POWER SUPPLY TEST AMP
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-791
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1630
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1630
ITEM: AMP
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-792
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ADP-1631
05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1631
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-793
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1632
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1632
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-794
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1633
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1633
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] C ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-795
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1634
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1634
THERMISTER THERMOMETER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-796
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-1635
05-6EE-2014-1
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1635
THERMISTER THERMOMETER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] ix]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-797
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ I ]
MECH/ADP-1636
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1636
FIELD EFFECT TRANSISTOR
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ] [
C 3 [ ] [
[ 3 C ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [x]
] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-798
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1637
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1637
FIELD EFFECT TRANSISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-799
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1638
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1638
CONTROL CIRCUIT
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-800
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1639
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1639
CONTROL CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-801
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1640
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1640
READ ONLY MEMORY
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] IF]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[p]
IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-802
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1641
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1641
READ ONLY MEMORY
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] IF]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-803
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CONPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-1642
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1642
TRANSDUCER TEMPAMP
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-804
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT :
MECH/ADP-1643
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP_EPD&C
1643
TRANSDUCER TEMP AMP
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-805
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMP_ [ / ]
MECH/ADP-1644
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1644
AMP
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-806
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1645
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1645
AMP
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] IF]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-807
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-1646
05-6EE-2014-1
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1646
TRANSISTOR
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
C ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-808
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1647
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
NDAC ID: 1647
ITEM: TRANSISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-809
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1648
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1648
AND GATE
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
C P ] [ F ] C P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-810
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1649
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1649
AND GATE
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-811
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1650
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1650
SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANAL¥ST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /XR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-812
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1651
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1651
SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[N] [N] [N]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-813
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1652
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1652
BINARY COUNTER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-814
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1653
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1653
BINARY COUNTER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDWlFUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ S ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-815
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1654
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1654
ADDRESSABLE SWITCH
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [F] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-816
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1655
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1655
ADDRESSABLE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
-[-- ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[P] IF] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-817
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1656
05-6EE-2014-1
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1656
AMP
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[p] [F]
IN] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ _ /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-818
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1657
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1657
ITEM: AMP
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] C P ] [ F ] C P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-819
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1658
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1658
SWITCHING LADDER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ _]
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-820
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1659
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1659
SWITCHING LADDER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P] [ F ] C P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-821
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1660
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1660
POLARITY DETECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-822
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1661
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/_DP/EPD&C
1661
POLARITY DETECTOR
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[X]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-823
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1662
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1662
CONTROL LOGIC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-824
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1663
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1663
CONTROL LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-825
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1664
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1664
REGISTER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-826
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1665
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1665
REGISTER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-827
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1666
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1666
DISCREET INPUT BUFFER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-828
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1667
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1667
DISCREET INPUT BUFFER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] IF]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[p]
IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-829
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1668
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1668
SERIAL/PARALLEL CONVERTER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-830
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1669
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1669
SERIAL/PARALLEL CONVERTER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-831
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1670
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1670
OSCILLATOR
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[x]
CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-832
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ IN ]
MECH/ADP-1671
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1671
OSCILLATOR
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] IF]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[p]
IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[X]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTARENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-833
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1672
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1672
2 MH2 CLOCK
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
CN] CN] CN]
[ ] *
[X]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-834
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1673
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1673
2 MH2 CLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-835
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1674
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1674
1 MH2 CLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-836
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1675
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1675
1 MH2 CLOCK
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-837
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1676
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1676
500 MH2 CLOCK
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_ [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] C F ] [ P ]
IN] CN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADWDELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-838
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1677
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1677
500 MH2 CLOCK
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
CX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-839
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1678
05-6EE-2014-1
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1678
COUNTER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-840
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRI T ICALI TY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ IN ]
MECH/ADP-1679
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1679
COUNTER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-841
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1680
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1680
ITEM: OR GATE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-842
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ADP-1681
05-6EE-2014-1
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1681
ITEM: OR GATE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-843
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1682
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1682
SENSOR WINDOW GENERATOR
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] IF] [P]
IN] IN] [N]
[ ] *
[X]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-844
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1683
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1683
SENSOR WINDOW GENERATOR
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-845
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1684
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1684
ITEM: BUFFER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-846
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1685
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1685
BUFFER
A. D • MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
IN] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-847
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1686
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1686
OUTPUT CONTROL
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[N] C_] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-848
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1687
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1687
OUTPUT CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
N_A [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-849
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1688
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1688
ENCODER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-850
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1689
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1689
ENCODER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P 1 [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-851
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1690
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1690
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X 3
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-852
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ADP-1691
05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID: 1691
ITEM: AMP
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-853
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ADP-1692
05-6EE-2014-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID: 1692
ITEM: CPU
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-854
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1693
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1693
ITEM: CPU
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-855
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1694
05-6EE-2014-I
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ IN ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1694
SELECTOR LOGIC
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-856
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1695
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1695
SELECTOR LOGIC
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADWDE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-857
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1696
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1696
READ ONLY MEMORY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-858
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1697
05-6EE-2014-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1697
ROM
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTARENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-859
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1698
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1698
READ/WRITE MEMORY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-860
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1699
NASA FME #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1699
READ/WRITE MEMORY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-861
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/22/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COHPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-1601
05-6EE-2015-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1601
SWITCH RELAY
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[P]
[p]
[ ]
B
[P]
[F]
[N]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-862
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/22/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_mC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ I ]
MECH/ADP-1603
05-6EE-2015-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1603
LATCH RELAY
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[p]
[ ]
B
[P]
[ F ]
[ N ]
C
[p]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-863
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/22/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1600
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2015-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1600
SWITCH RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD ALLOW HEATER TO DAMAGE PROBE
CAUSING LOSS OF ADTAS DATA DURING FLIGHT. REVIEW SHOWED LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE WAS READILY APPARENT HOWEVER, PASSING SCREEN
B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-864
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/22/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1602
05-6EE-2015-2
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1602
LATCH RELAY
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
CP] CF] CP]
C ] C ] C ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD ALLOW HEATER TO DAMAGE PROBE
CAUSING LOSS OF ADTAS DATA DURING FLIGHT. REVIEW SHOWED LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE WAS READILY APPARENT HOWEVER, PASSING SCREEN
B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-865
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1595
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2016-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1595
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE DETERMINED TO BE NOT READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE DOES NOT PASS SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-866
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/ADP-1597
05-6EE-2016-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1597
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE DETERMINED TO BE NOT READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE DOES NOT PASS SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-867
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-1599
05-6EE-2016-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1599
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[P]
[ ]
B
[p]
IF]
[N]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE DETERMINED TO BE NOT READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE DOES NOT PASS SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-868
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1594
05-6EE-2016-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1594
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] IN]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-869
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1596
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2016-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1596
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/IR] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[F] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[x]*
[ ]
CO.ARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] C F ] C P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-870
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YS TEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRI TI CALI TY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1598
05-6EE-2016-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1598
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] IF]
[ ] [ ]
IN] IN]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
iN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-871
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/ADP-1589
05-6EE-2017-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1589
ITEM: AND GATE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM NOT DETERMINED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE NOT PASSING SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-872
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/ADP-1591
05-6EE-2017-I
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1591
TIME DELAY
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
[F] [P] [X]
[N] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM NOT DETERMINED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE NOT PASSING SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-873
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ME /ADP-lS93
05-6EE-2017-1
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1593
SOLID STATE DRIVER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] C P ] C P ] C P ] C ] *
IOA C 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM NOT DETERMINED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE NOT PASSING SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-874
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/18/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1588
05-6EE-2017-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1588
AND GATE
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[p]
[ ]
IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-875
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/18/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1590
05-6EE-2017-2
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1590
TIME DELAY
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
IN] IN]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-876
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/18/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP-1592
05-6EE-2017-2
ME_/ADP/EPD&C
1592
SOLID STATE DRIVER
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[P]
[ ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-877
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9500
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EF-2003-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/SDM/EPD&C
9500
CIRCUIT BREAKER/SWITCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FME/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-878
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/SDM-9500A
05-6EF-2003-2
COMPARE [ N / ]
MECH/SDM/EPD&C
9500
CIRCUIT BREAKER/SWITCH
H.J. LOWERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-879
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-16515X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EG-2009-I
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 16515
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
[P]
[P]
[ ]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ix]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-880
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/PBR-6507
05-6EG-2010-I
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
MECH/PBR/EPD&C
6507
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
W.T. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] C ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6508,
6509, 6510.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-881
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6508
NASA FMEA # : 05-6EG-2010-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBR/EPD&C
6508
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6507,
6509, 6510.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-882
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6509A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EG-2010-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR/EPD&C
6509
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
LEAD ANALYST : W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC IDts 6507,
6508, 6510.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-883
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6510A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EG-2010-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR/EPD&C
6510
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH (S5/$7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6507,
6508, 6509.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-884
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
MECH/PBR-6509
05-6EG-2010-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBR/EPD&C
6509
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
W.T. SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. SEE RELATED MDAC ID 6510.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-885
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6510
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EG-2010-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/PBR/EPD&C
6510
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH (S5/S7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CO'ARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. SEE RELATED MDAC ID 6510.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-886
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/PBR-16516X
05-6EG-2017-I
MECH/PBR
16516
MID MCA i, 2, 3, 4
W. SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] C P ]
[P] CP]
[ ] C ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[x]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-887
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4517
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4517
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-888
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4519
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4519
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-889
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4521
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4521
+28V CONTACT #3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA C 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] C P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT, PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-890
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4523
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4523
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-891
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4525
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4525
+28V CONTACT #i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-892
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4527
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4527
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-893
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4529
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4529
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P ] [ F 3 [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-894
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4531
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4531
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-895
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4533
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4533
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-896
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4535
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4535
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-897
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4537
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4537
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] C ] [ N ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-898
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4539
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4539
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ J
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-899
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KSD-4540
05-6EH-56000-I
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4540
TALKBACK
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-900
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4541
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4541
TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-901
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4542
05-6EH-56000-I
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4542
TALKBACK
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
IX]*
Ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-902
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4517A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4517
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-903
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4519A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4519
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-904
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4521A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4521
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] C P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT, PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-905
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4523A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4523
+28V CONTACT #4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-906
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4525A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4525
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-907
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4527A
05-6EH-56000-3
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4527
+28V CONTACT #2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-908
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4529A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4529
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] C P ] C P ] C x ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] C P ] [ F ] [ P ] C X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] C P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-909
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4531A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4531
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-910
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4533A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4533
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-911
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4535A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4535
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-912
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
MEC_/KSD-4537A
05-6EH-56000-3
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4537
+28V CONTACT #3
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[P]
[ ]
B
[P]
[ F ]
IN]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-913
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4539A
05-6EH-56000-3
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4539
+28V CONTACT #4
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-914
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD-4540A
05-6EH-56000-3
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4540
TALKBACK
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-915
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4541A
05-6EH-56000-3
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4541
TALKBACK
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASLINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
C ] [ ] C ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ x] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-916
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4542A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4542
TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] CP] CP]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] [N] IN]
[X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-917
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4516
NASA FMEA # : 05-6EH-56000-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4516
+28V CONTACT # 1
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-918
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4518
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4518
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-919
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4520
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4520
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-920
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4522
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4522
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-921
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4524
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4524
+28V CONTACT #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-922
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4526
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4526
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-923
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4528
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4528
+28V CONTACT #3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-924
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4530
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4530
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-925
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4532
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4532
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /iR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-926
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4534
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4534
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-927
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4536
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4536
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-928
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: MECH/KBD-4538
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4538
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-929
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14688X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56004-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14688
DIODE (DEPLOY CONTROL)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWA¥
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-930
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14689X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56007-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14689
DIODE (STOW ENABLE CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ 1 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-931
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/KBD-14690X
05-6EH-56010-I
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14690
RESISTOR (STOW SIGNAL)
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-932
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/KBD-14691X
05-6EH-56010-2
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14691
RESISTOR (STOW SIGNAL)
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] IF]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE/_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-933
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14692X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56011-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14692
RESISTOR (STOW ENABLE SIGNAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-934
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14693X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56011-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14693
RESISTOR (STOW ENABLE SIGNAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-935
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4547
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4547
AND GATE #i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-936
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4549
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4549
AND GATE #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-937
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4555
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4555
ITEM: AMP #1
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-938
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4557
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4557
ITEM: AMP #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-939
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4563
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4563
ITEM: K72
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A°D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-940
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/KBD-4565
05-6EH-56020-2
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4565
K70
A.D. MONTC, OMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[p] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-941
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4569
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4569
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-942
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4575
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4575
AND GATE #I
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-943
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4577
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4577
AND GATE #2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RYe:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-944
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4583
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4583
ITEM: AMP #1
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-945
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4585
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4585
ITEM: AMP #2
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-946
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/KBD-4592
05-6EH-56020-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4592
ITEM: K27
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[P] IF]
[P] IF]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-947
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/KBD-4594
05-6EH-56020-2
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4594
K37
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-948
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4598
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4598
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-949
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4543
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4543
AND GATE #i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-950
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4545
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4545
AND GATE #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-951
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4551
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4551
ITEM: AMP #i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-952
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4553
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4553
ITEM: AMP #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /iR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
CO_PARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-953
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/KBD-4559
05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4559
ITEM: KI4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-954
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
_DW/nmC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD-4561
05-6EH-56021-2
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4561
K68
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[x] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-955
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4567
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4567
STOW MICROSWITCH #1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-956
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4571
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4571
AND GATE #1
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-957
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4573
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4573
AND GATE #2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-958
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4579
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4579
ITEM: AMP #1
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-959
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4581
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4581
ITEM: AMP #2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-960
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MECH/KBD-4587
05-6EH-56021-2
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4587
ITEM: K25
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-961
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmc
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD-4589
05-6EH-56021-2
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4589
K2
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-962
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4596
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4596
STOW MICROSWITCH #2
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE C N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-963
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14694X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56051-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14694
DIODE (DEPLOY POS. INDICATION)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-964
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/KBD-14695X
05-6EH-56054-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14695
DIODE (DEPLOYED/XMIT SCAN ENABLE)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
M. BRADWAY
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-965
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-14696X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56054-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MEH/KBD/EPD&C
14696
DIODE (DEPLOYED/XMIT SCAN ENABLE)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-966
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
coxP_ [ I ]
MECH/KBD-14697X
05-6EH-56055-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14697
FUSE (DEPLOY/XMIT SCAN ENABLE)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
M. BRADWAY
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-967
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/KBD-14698X
05-6EH-56056-I
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14698
DIODE (STOW INITIATE)
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] IF]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
CP]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C x]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
Ix]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-968
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MECH/KBD-14699X
05-6EH-56057-I
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14699
FUSE (STOW INITIATE)
M. BRADWAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] IF]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
CP]
CP]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-969
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4501
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4501
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ ] [ 3 [ 3 [ X 3
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-970
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4503
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4503
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-971
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4505
05-6EH-56060-I
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4505
+28V CONTACT #3
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] [N] IN]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-972
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4507
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4507
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
C ] C ] C ]
C N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-973
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4509
05-6EH-56060-I
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4509
+28V CONTACT #I
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-974
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4511
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4511
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-975
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4513
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-1
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4513
+28V CONTACT #3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-976
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4515
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4515
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-977
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4501A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4501
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-978
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4503A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4503
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-979
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD-4505A
05-6EH-56060-3
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4505
+28V CONTACT #3
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
IN] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-980
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4507A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4507
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-981
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
.DW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
MECH/KBD-4509A
05-6EH-56060-3
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4509
+28V CONTACT #I
A.D. MONTGOMERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[p]
[ ]
B
[ NA]
[ F ]
IN]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-982
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4511A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4511
+28V CONTACT #2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-983
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4513A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4513
+28V CONTACT #3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-984
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4515A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4515
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-985
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4500
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4500
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-986
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4502
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4502
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-987
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MECH/KBD-4504
05-6EH-56060-6
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4504
+28V CONTACT #3
A.D. MONTGOMERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-988
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4506
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4506
+28V CONTACT #4
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-989
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4508
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4508
+28V CONTACT #i
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-990
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4510
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4510
+28V CONTACT #2
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-991
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4512
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4512
+28V CONTACT #3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-992
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4514
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4514
+28V CONTACT #4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 C-993

APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
D-I
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
02-4-052000-1
02-4-052000-4
02-4-054000-1
05-6EE-2002-1
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
ii01
ii01
1104
1105
1106
1107
1108
1500
1500
1501
1501
1502
1502
1503
1503
1504
1504
1505
1505
1506
i506
1507
1507
1508
1508
1509
1509
1510
1510
1511
1511
1512
1512
1513
1513
1514
1514
1515
1515
1516
1516
1517
1517
1518
1518
MOTOR
MOTOR
PRESSURE LINE
PROBE
PROBE
SHAFT
SHAFT
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS TO OPERATE
FAILS TO OPERATE
LEAKAGE
JAMMED
CLOGGED PORT
BROKEN
BENT
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
D-2
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
1519
1519
1520
1520
1521
1521
1522
1522
1523
1523
1532
1532
1533
1534
1534
1534
1535
1535
1536
1536
1537
1537
1538
1538
1539
1539
1540
1540
1541
1541
1542
1542
1543
1543
1544
1544
1545
1545
1546
1546
1547
1547
1548
1548
1549
1549
1550
1550
1551
1551
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
D-3
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2002-I
05-6EE-2002-2
05-6EE-2017-2
05-6EE-2017-I
05-6EE-2017-2
05-6EE-2017-I
05-6EE-2017-2
05-6EE-2017-I
05-6EE-2016-2
05-6EE-2016-I
05-6EE-2016-2
05-6EE-2016-I
05-6EE-2016-2
05-6EE-2016-I
05-6EE-2015-2
05-6EE-2015-2
02-2D/4-EI00-1
02-2D/4-EI00-1
02-2D/4-E100-1
02-2D/4-EI00-1
02-2D/4-EIO0-1
02-2D/4-E100-1
02-4D-014600-I
02-4D-014600-I
02-4D-014600-3
02-4D-014600-I
02-4D-014000-3
02-4D-014600-I
02-4D-014000-I
02-4D-14700-2
02-4D-012600-I
02-4D-012600-I
02-4D-012600-3
02-4D-012600-I
02-4D-012000-I
02-4D-012600-5
02-4D-013600-5
02-4D-012600-I
02-4D-012600-4
02-4D-013600-4
02-4D-013600-5
02-4D-012100-I
02-4D-012100-2
02-4D-012100-I
1552
1552
1553
1553
1554
1554
1555
1555
1588
1589
1590
1591
1592
1593
1594
1595
1596
1597
1598
1599
1600
1602
2100
2101
2102
2103
2104
2105
3101
3103
3104
3105
3106
3107
3108
3109
3111
3113
3114
3115
3116
3116
3116
3117
3117
3117
3117
3119
3120
3121
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
AND GATE
AND GATE
TIME DELAY
TIME DELAY
SOLID STATE DRIVER
SOLID STATE DRIVER
REMOTE POWER CONTROLL
REMOTE POWER CONTROLL
REMOTE POWER CONTROLL
REMOTE POWER CONTROLL
REMOTE POWER CONTROLL
REMOTE POWER CONTROLL
SWITCH RELAY
LATCH RELAY
ROD ASSEMBLY
ROD ASSEMBLY
BELLCRANK
BELLCRANK
BOLT
BOLT
CENTERLINE LATCH MOTO
CENTERLINE MOTOR CLUT
CENTERLINE MOTOR BRAK
CENTERLINE MOTOR BRAK
CENTERLINE LATCH DIFF
CENTERLINE LATCH DIFF
CENTERLINE LATCH
CENTERLINE LATCH LIMI
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CL
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR BR
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR BR
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D
DOOR LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
HINGE LINKAGE ASSEMBL
HINGE LINKAGE ASSEMBL
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO DISENGAG
FAILS TO ENGAGE
FAILS TO DISENGAG
PHYSICAL BINDING
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING
PREMATURE OPER
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO DISENGAG
FAILS TO ENGAGE
FAILS TO DISENGAG
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LINKAGE BROKEN
PHYSICAL BINDING
LINKAGE BROKEN
D-4
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
02-4D-012100-2
02-4D-012100-I
02-4D-012700-2
02-4D-012100-2
02-4D-012100-I
02-4D-013300-2
02-4D-013300-2
02-4D-013600-I
02-4D-013600-5
02-4D-013600-I
02-4D-013600-5
02-4D-013600-3
02-4D-013600-I
02-4D-012600-5
02-4D-013000-I
02-4D-012600-5
02-4D-013600-1
02-4D-013300-I
02-4D-013300-2
02-4D-013300-I
02-4D-013300-2
02-4D-013300-I
02-4D-013300-2
02-4D-013700-2
05-6ED-2126-2
05-6ED-2127-I
05-6ED-2127-2
05-6ED-2129-I
05-6ED-2130-2
05-6ED-2131-I
05-6ED-2131-2
05-6ED-2132-2
05-6ED-2127-I
05-6ED-2127-2
05-6ED-2126-2
05-6ED-2129-I
05-6ED-2130-2
05-6ED-2131-I
05-6ED-2131-2
05-6ED-2132-2
05-6ED-2026-3
05-6ED-2026-4
05-6ED-2026-3
05-6ED-2026-4
05-6ED-2027-2
05-6ED-2027-3
05-6ED-2027-2
05-6ED-2027-3
05-6ED-2028-3
05-6ED-2030-3
05-6ED-2028-3
3122
3123
3124
3126
3127
3128
3129
3130
3131
3132
3132
3133
3134
3135
3135
3136
3136
3137
3138
3139
3140
3141
3142
3143
3501
3501
3501
3501
3501
3501
3501
3501
3502
3502
3503
3503
3503
3503
3503
3503
3505
3505
3506
3506
3507
3507
3508
3508
3509
3509
3510
DOOR CLOSURE TORQUE T
DOOR CLOSURE TORQUE T
DOOR CLOSURE LIMIT SW
DOOR HINGE
DOOR HINGE
DOOR UPLATCH ROLLER
UMBILICAL DOOR
UPLOCK LATCH MOTOR
UPLATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
UPLATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
UPLATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
UPLATCH MOTOR BRAKE
UPLATCH MOTOR BRAKE
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/D
UPLATCH TORQUE TUBE A
UPLATCH TORQUE TUBE A
INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH
INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANIS
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANIS
READY TO LATCH LIMIT
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MOD
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MOD
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MOD
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MOD
CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW
CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW
CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW
CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPE
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPE
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPE
PHYSICAL BINDING
TORQUE TUBE BROKE
PREMATURE OPER
PHYSICAL BINDING
STRUCTURAL FAILUR
BROKEN OFF DOOR
DAMAGED ON ASCENT
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO ENGAGE
FAILS TO DISENGAG
FAILS TO DISENGAG
FAILS TO ENGAGE
FAILS TO DISENGAG
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING
TORQUE TUBE BROKE
PHYSICAL BINDING
BROKEN/UNATTACHED
PHYSICAL BINDING
BROKEN/UNATTACHED
PREMATURE OPER
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
D-5
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
05-6ED-2030-3
05-6ED-2250-I
05-6ED-2251A-I
05-6ED-2251A-2
05-6ED-2251B-2
05-6ED-2252-2
05-6ED-2252B-2
05-6ED-2257-2
05-6ED-2251A-I
05-6ED-2251A-2
05-6ED-2251B-2
05-6ED-2252-2
05-6ED-2252B-2
05-6ED-2252C-2
05-6ED-2255-2
05-6ED-2257-2
05-6ED-2257A-2
05-6EH-56060-6
05-6EH-56060-I
05-6EH-56060-3
05-6EH-56060-6
05-6EH-56060-I
05-6EH-56060-3
05-6EH-56060-6
05-6EH-56060-I
05-6EH-56060-3
05-6EH-56060-6
05-6EH-56060-I
05-6EH-56060-3
05-6EH-56060-6
05-6EH-56060-I
05-6EH-56060-3
05-6EH-56060-6
05-6EH-56060-I
05-6EH-56060-3
05-6EH-56060-6
05-6EH-56060-I
05-6EH-56060-3
05-6EH-56060-6
05-6EH-56060-I
05-6EH-56060-3
05-6EH-56000-4
05-6EH-56000-I
05-6EH-56000-3
05-6EH-56000-4
05-6EH-56000-I
05-6EH-56000-3
05-6EH-56000-4
05-6EH-56000-I
3510
3522
3522
3522
3522
3522
3522
3522
3523
3523
3523
3523
3523
3523
3523
3523
3523
4500
4501
4501
4502
4503
4503
4504
4505
4505
4506
4507
4507
4508
4509
4509
4510
4511
4511
4512
4513
4513
4514
4515
4515
4516
4517
4517
4518
4519
4519
4520
4521
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #1
+28V CONTACT #1
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS TO SWITCH
OPEN CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT
SHORTED OUT
SHORTED OUT
SHORTED OUT
SHORTED OUT
SHORTED OUT
SHORTED OUT
SHORTED OUT
SHORTED OUT
SHORTED OUT
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
D-6
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
05-6EH-56000-3
05-6EH-56000-4
05-6EH-56000-I
05-6EH-56000-3
05-6EH-56000-4
05-6EH-56000-I
05-6EH-56000-3
05-6EH-56000-4
05-6EH-56000-I
05-6EH-56000-3
05-6EH-56000-4
05-6EH-56000-I
05-6EH-56000-3
05-6EH-56000-4
05-6EH-56000-I
05-6EH-56000-3
05-6EH-56000-4
05-6EH-56000-I
05-6EH-56000-3
05-6EH-56000-4
05-6EH-56000-I
05-6EH-56000-3
05-6EH-56000-4
05-6EH-56000-I
05-6EH-56000-3
05-6EH-56000-4
05-6EH-56000-I
05-6EH-56000-3
05-6EH-56000-I
05-6EH-56000-3
05-6EH-56000-1
05-6EH-56000-3
05-6EH-56000-I
05-6EH-56000-3
05-6EH-56021-2
05-6EH-56020-2
05-6EH-56020-2
05-6EH-56021-2
05-6EH-56021-2
05-6EH-56020-2
05-6EH-56020-2
05-6EH-56021-2
05-6EH-56021-2
05-6EH-56020-2
05-6EH-56020-2
05-6EH-56021-2
05-6EH-56020-2
05-6EH-56021-2
05-6EH-56021-2
4521
4522
4523
4523
4524
4525
4525
4526
4527
4527
4528
4529
4529
4530
4531
4531
4532
4533
4533
4534
4535
4535
4536
4537
4537
4538
4539
4539
4540
4540
4541
4541
4542
4542
4545
4547
4549
4551
4553
4555
4557
4559
4561
4563
4565
4567
4569
4571
4573
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #1
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
TALKBACK
TALKBACK
TALKBACK
TALKBACK
TALKBACK
TALKBACK
AND GATE #2
AND GATE #1
AND GATE #2
AMP #i
AMP #2
AMP #i
AMP #2
KI4
K68
K72
K70
STOW MICROSWITCH #i
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #I
AND GATE #1
AND GATE #2
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS TO DEPLOY
FAILS TO DEPLOY
FAILS TO BARBERPO
FAILS TO BARBERPO
FAILS TO STOW
FAILS TO STOW
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
D-7
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
05-6EH-56020-2
05-6EH-56020-2
05-6EH-56021-2
05-6EH-56021-2
05-6EH-56020-2
05-6EH-56020-2
05-6EH-56021-2
05-6EH-56021-2
05-6EH-56020-2
05-6EH-56020-2
05-6EH-56021-2
05-6EH-56020-2
02-4B-001-2
02-4B-002-3
02-4B-005-I
02-4B-002-I
02-4B-I01-I
02-4B-001-I
02-4B-002-I
02-4B-005-4
02-4B-005-6
02-4B-001-I
02-4B-002-I
02-4B-001-2
02-4B-002-I
02-4B-002-3
02-4B-001-I
02-4B-001-2
02-4B-002-I
02-4B-002-3
02-4B-002-I
02-4B-006-4
02-4B-002-I
02-4B-006-2
02-4B-007-I
02-4B-007-3
02-4B-007-2
02-4B-007-4
02-4B-001-2
02-4B-002-I
02-4B-002-3
02-4B-006-5
02-4B-002-I
02-4B-001-2
02-4B-002-I
02-4B-002-3
02-4B-006-5
02-4B-003-2
02-4B-I12-I
4575
4577
4579
4581
4583
4585
4587
4589
4592
4594
4596
4598
5101
5101
5101
5102
5102
5104
5104
5105
5105
5106
5106
5107
5107
5107
5108
5108
5108
5108
5109
5109
5110
5111
5111
5111
5112
5112
5113
5113
5113
5113
5114
5115
5115
5115
5115
5119
5120
AND GATE #1
AND GATE #2
AMP #1
AMP #2
AMP #I
AMP #2
K25
K2
K27
K37
STOW MICROSWITCH #2
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #2
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD L
CENTERLINE/BUI/q4EAD L
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD T
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD T
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD T
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD T
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD T
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD T
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD G
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD C
CENTERLINE LATCH GANG
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
FAILS TO ENGAGE
FAILS TO ENGAGE
FAILS TO DISENGAG
FAILS TO DISENGAG
FAILS TO ENGAGE
FAILS TO ENGAGE
SLIPS
SLIPS
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
FAILS TO OPERATE
FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS TO TRANSFER
FAILS TO TRANSFER
FAILS TO TRANSFER
FAILS TO TRANSFER
PHYSICAL BINDING
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PREMATURE OPER
BROKEN
D-8
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
02-4B-002-I
02-4B-002-I
02-4B-006-I
02-4B-I13-I
02-4B-I13-2
02-4B-I14-I
02-4B-I13-I
02-4B-II0-I
02-4B-II0-I
02-4B-403-I
02-4B-403-I
02-4B-403-2
02-4B-403-I
02-4B-403-I
02-4B-403-I
02-4B-403-2
02-4B-403-I
02-4B-001-I
02-4B-I06-I
02-4B-001-I
02-4B-099-I
02-4B-001-I
02-4B-008-I
02-4B-008-2
02-4B-I07-I
02-4B-I08-I
02-4B-008-I
02-4B-001-I
02-4B-140-2
02-4B-203-I
02-4B-203-I
02-4B-203-I
02-4B-203-2
02-4B-203-I
02-4B-203-I
02-4B-203-I
02-4B-202-I
02-4B-204-2
02-4B-202-I
02-4B-202-2
02-4B-204-2
02-4B-200-I
02-4B-201-I
02-4B-200-I
02-4B-202-2
02-4B-207-I
02-4B-207-2
02-4B-204-I
02-4B-204-I
5121
5122
5122
5123
5123
5123
5124
5125
5126
5127
5128
5128
5129
5130
5131
5131
5132
5133
5134
5135
5136
5137
5138
5138
5138
5138
5139
5140
5145
5146
5147
5149
5150
5151
5152
5153
5154
5155
5156
5157
5157
5158
5159
5161
5162
5162
5163
5164
5165
CENTERLINE LATCH GANG
CENTERLINE LATCH ASSE
CENTERLINE LATCH ASSE
CENTERLINE LATCH ASSE
CENTERLINE LATCH ASSE
CENTERLINE LATCH ASSE
CENTERLINE LATCH ASSE
CENTERLINE LATCH ROLL
CENTERLINE LATCH ROLL
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROL
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROL
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROL
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROL
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLA
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLA
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLA
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLA
BULKHEAD LATCH GANG B
BULKHEAD LATCH GANG B
BULKHEAD PUSH-PULL RO
BULKHEAD PUSH-PULL RO
BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAG
BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAG
BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAG
BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAG
BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAG
BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAG
BULKHEAD ROLLER ASSEM
BULKHEAD READY-TO-LAT
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
BROKEN COMPONENT
BROKEN COMPONENT
BROKEN COMPONENT
LATCH HOOK FAILS
PHYSICAL BINDING
BROKEN
FAILS TO ENGAGE
BROKEN
BROKEN
PHYSICAL BINDING
FAILS TO ENGAGE
BROKEN
BROKEN
BENT
PHYSICAL BINDING
BROKEN
PHYSICAL BINDING
BROKEN
PHYSICAL BINDING
BROKEN
BROKEN
BROKEN
BROKEN
FAILS TO LATCH
PHYSICAL BINDING
PREMATURE OPER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
FAILS TO ENGAGE
FAILS TO DISENGAGE
FAILS TO ENGAGE
SLIPS
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING
FAILS TO OPERATE
PHYSICAL BINDING
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
BROKEN
SEIZED BEARING
BROKEN SUPPORT
FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS OUT OF TOL
TORQUE LIMITER
JAMMED ROTARY ACT
D-9
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
02-4B-209-2
02-4B-204-I
02-4B-209-I
02-4B-209-2
02-4B-I09-I
02-4B-206-I
05-6EB-2000-I
05-6EB-2001-I
05-6EB-2001-2
05-6EB-2010-I
05-6EB-2010-2
05-6EB-2011-I
05-6EB-2004-I
05-6EB-2004-2
05-6EB-2005-I
05-6EB-2005-2
05-6EB-2004-2
05-6EB-2005-I
05-6EB-2005-2
02-4G-179-2
02-4G-183-2
02-4G-180-I
02-4G-180-2
02-4G-181-I
02-4G-176-I
02-4G-153-I
02-4G-153-2
02-4G-155-2
02-4G-155-I
02-4G-154-2
02-4G-154-3
02-4G-151-2
02-4G-158-I
02-4G-151-2
02-4G-151-3
02-4G-156-I
02-4G-156-2
02-4G-186-I
05-65G-2001-01
05-65G-2001-01
05-65G-2001-01
05-65G-2001-01
05-6EG-2010-1
05-6EG-2010-I
05-6EG-2010-I
05-6EG-2010-3
05-6EG-2010-I
05-6EG-2010-3
02-4A-593309-I
5166
5167
5168
5169
5176
5179
5502
5504
5504
5504
5504
5505
5507
5507
5507
5507
5508
5508
5508
6103
6104
6107
6108
6111
6113
6201
6203
6204
6205
6207
6208
6211
6211
6212
6212
6301
6302
6302
6501
6502
6503
6504
6507
6508
6509
6509
6510
6510
7100
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR ALIG
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR SHEA
CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESI
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CON
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CON
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CON
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CON
FUSE, IA
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
MOTOR BRAKE
TORQUE LIMITER
GEARBOX
GEARBOX
LATCH TORQUE SHAFT AS
LATCH HOOK MECHANISM
MOTOR
MOTOR BRAKE
TORQUE LIMITER
TORQUE LIMITER
GEARBOX
GEARBOX
DEPLOYMENT TORQUE SHA
DEPLOYMENT TORQUE SHA
DEPLOYMENT ROTARY ACT
DEPLOYMENT ROTARY ACT
HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS
HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS
HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH
RADIATOR CONTROL SWIT
RADIATOR CONTROL SWIT
RADIATOR CONTROL SWIT
RADIATOR CONTROL SWIT
RADIATOR CONTROL SWIT
RADIATOR CONTROL SWIT
PRESSURE PORT
ROTARY ACTUATOR
BROKEN MOUNTING
PHYSICAL BINDING
BROKEN
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
OPEN CIRCUIT
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN
PHYSICAL BINDING
FAILS OUT OF TOL
PHYSICAL BINDING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDIND
FAILS TO RELEASE
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING
FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS OUT OF TOL
PHYSICAL BINDING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
PHYSICAL BINDING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
FAILS TO RELEASE
FAILS IN RELEASE
FAILS TO LATCH
FAILS IN LATCH
FAILS TO DEPLOY
FAILS IN DEPLOY
FAILS TO STOW
FAILS TO STOW
FAILS IN STOW
FAILS IN STOW
CLOGGED
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NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
02-4A-593309-1
02-4A-593302-2
02-4A-593302-2
02-4A-593302-I
02-4A-593302-I
02-4A-593302-I
02-4A-593202-I
02-4A-593202-I
02-4A-593202-I
02-4A-593202-3
02-4A-593202-3
01-5B-380102-I
01-5B-380103-I
01-5B-380108-I
01-5B-380110-I
01-5B-380116-I
01-5B-380118-I
01-5B-380120-I
01-5B-380126-I
01-5B-380105-I
01-5B-380108-I
01-5B-380111-I
01-5B-380113-I
01-5B-380119-I
01-5B-380127-I
01-5B-380129-I
01-5B-380101-I
01-5B-380104-I
01-5B-380109-I
01-5B-380112-I
01-5B-380117-I
01-5B-380125-I
01-5B-380128-I
01-5B-380104-I
01-5B-380105-I
01-5B-380106-I
01-5B-380106-3
01-5B-380107-3
01-5B-380112-I
01-5B-380113-I
01-5B-380114-I
01-5B-380114-3
01-5B-380115-2
01-5B-380115-3
01-5B-380122-I
01-5B-380122-3
01-5B-380123-2
01-5B-380123-3
01-5B-380128-I
7101
7102
7103
7106
7107
7108
7109
7110
7111
7112
7113
8100
8100
8100
8100
8100
8100
8100
8100
8101
8101
8101
8101
8101
8101
8101
8102
8102
8102
8102
8102
8102
8102
8103
8103
8103
8103
8103
8103
8103
8103
8103
8103
8103
8103
8103
8103
8103
8103
PRESSURE PORT
0 RING
0 RING
ACTUATOR
ACTUATOR
ACTUATOR
ACTUATOR
ACTUATOR
ACTUATOR
O RING
O RING
ROD ASSEMBLY
ROD ASSEMBLY
ROD ASSEMBLY
ROD ASSEMBLY
ROD ASSEMBLY
ROD ASSEMBLY
ROD ASSEMBLY
ROD ASSEMBLY
BELLCRANK
BELLCRANK
BELLCRANK
BELLCRANK
BELLCRANK
BELLCRANK
BELLCRANK
BOLT/BRACKET/DOUBLER
BOLT/ BRACKET/DOUBLER
BOLT/BRACKET/DOUBLER
BOLT/BRACKET/DOUBLER
BOLT/BRACKET/DOUBLER
BOLT/BRACKET/DOUBLER
BOLT/BRACKET/DOUBLER
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
LEAKAGE
LEAKAGE
CRACKED
BROKEN GEAR
BROKEN SHAFT
JAMMED
BROKEN GEAR
BROKEN SHAFT
JAMMED
CRACKED
LEAKAGE
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
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NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
01-5B-380130-I
01-5B-380130-3
01-5B-380104-I
01-5B-380105-I
01-5B-380107-2
01-5B-380107-3
01-5B-380112-I
01-5B-380113-I
01-5B-380114-I
01-5B-380114-3
01-5B-380115-2
01-5B-380115-3
01-5B-380122-I
01-5B-380122-3
01-5B-380123-2
01-5B-380123-3
01-5B-380128-I
01-5B-380130-I
01-5B-380130-3
01-5B-380131-2
01-5B-380131-3
01-5B-380107-I
01-5B-380115-I
01-5B-380123-I
01-5B-380131-I
01-5B-380115-I
01-5B-380123-I
01-5B-380131-I
05-6AB-2026A-2
05-6AB-2027-2
05-6AB-2028
05-6AB-2029-2
05-6AB-2030A-2
05-6AB-2031A
05-6AB-2026A-2
05-6AB-2027-2
05-6AB-2028
05-6AB-2029-2
05-6AB-2030A-2
05-6AB-2031A
05-6AB-2026A-2
05-6AB-2027-2
05-6AB-2028
05-6AB-2029-2
05-6AB-2030A-2
05-6AB-203 IA
05-6AB-2126-2
05-6AB-2128-I
05-6AB-2129-2
8103
8103
8104
8104
8104
8104
8104
8104
8104
8104
8104
8104
8104
8104
8104
8104
8104
8104
8104
8104
8104
8105
8105
8105
8105
8106
8106
8106
8107
8107
8107
8107
8107
8107
8108
8108
8108
8108
8108
8108
8502
8502
8502
8502
8502
8502
8503
8503
8503
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S
DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRA
DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRA
DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRA
DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRA
DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRA
DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRA
DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRA
MICROSWITCH POSITION
MICROSWITCH POSITION
MICROSWITCH POSITION
MICROSWITCH POSITION
MICROSWITCH POSITION
MICROSWITCH POSITION
MICROSWITCH POSITION
MICROSWITCH POSITION
MICROSWITCH POSITION
MICROSWITCH POSITION
MICROSWITCH POSITION
MICROSWITCH POSITION
ACTUATOR SWITCH MODUL
ACTUATOR SWITCH MODUL
ACTUATOR SWITCH MODUL
ACTUATOR SWITCH MODUL
ACTUATOR SWITCH MODUL
ACTUATOR SWITCH MODUL
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA AC POWER RELAY
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
FAILS TO REMAIN
FAILS TO REMAIN
FAILS TO REMAIN
FAILS TO REMAIN
FAILS TO REMAIN
FAILS TO REMAIN
FAILS TO REMAIN
FAILS TO REMAIN
FAILS TO REMAIN
FAILS TO REMAIN
FAILS TO REMAIN
FAILS TO REMAIN
FAILS TO REMAIN
FAILS TO REMAIN
FAILS TO REMAIN
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
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NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
05-6AB-2130-I
05-6AB-2130-2
05-6AB-2133-2
05-6AB-2134-2
05-6AB-2135-I
05-6AB-2138-I
05-6AB-2139-2
05-6AB-2177-I
05-6AB-2252-I
05-6AB-2252-I
05-6AB-2201-2
05-6AB-2202-2
05-6AB-2204-2
05-6AB-2201-2
05-6AB-2202-2
05-6AB-2204-2
05-6AB-2201-2
05-6AB-2202-2
05-6AB-2204-2
05-6AB-2201-2
05-6AB-2202-2
05-6AB-2204-2
02-4F-032001-I
02-4F-032001-3
02-4F-032001-5
02-4F-032001-3
02-4F-032001-4
05-6EF-2003-I
05-6EF-2003-2
05-6EE-2001-I
05-6EE-2008-2
05-6EE-2009-2
05-6EE-2012-I
05-6EE-2012-2
05-6EH-56004-2
05-6EH-56007-2
05-6EH-56010-I
05-6EH-56010-2
05-6EH-56011-I
05-6EH-56011-2
05-6EH-56051-2
05-6EH-56054-I
05-6EH-56054-2
05-6EH-56055-I
05-6EH-56056-I
05-6EH-56057-I
02-4G-157-I
02-4G-301-2
02-4G-152-I
85O3
8503
8503
8503
8503
8503
8503
8503
8507
8508
8511
8511
8511
8512
8512
8512
8513
8513
8513
8517
8517
8517
9100
9100
9100
9101
9101
9500
9500
11700
11704
11706
11707
11708
14688
14689
14690
14691
14692
14693
14694
14695
14696
14697
14698
14699
16511
16512
16513
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA DIODE
MCA DIODE
MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR
MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR
MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR
MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR
MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR
MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR
GPC SOFTWARE
GPC SOFTWARE
GPC SOFTWARE
GPC SOFTWARE
GPC SOFTWARE
GPC SOFTWARE
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT -
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT -
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT -
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT -
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT -
CIRCUIT BREAKER/SWITC
CIRCUIT BREAKER/SWITC
FUSE (IA) MOTOR POWER
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE
DIODE (DEPLOY CONTROL
DIODE (STOW ENABLE CI
RESISTOR (STOW SIGNAL
RESISTOR (STOW SIGNAL
RESISTOR (STOW ENABLE
RESISTOR (STOW ENABLE
DIODE (DEPLOY POS. IN
DIODE (DEPLOYED/XMIT
DIODE (DEPLOYED/XMIT
FUSE (DEPLOY/XMIT SCA
DIODE (STOW INITIATE)
FUSE (STOW INITIATE)
BEARING, TORQUE SHAFT
SWITCH MODULE, LIMIT,
LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
SHORTED
DELAYED OPERATION
DELAYED OPERATION
DELAYED OPERATION
INADVERTENT OPERA
INADVERTENT OPERA
INADVERTENT OPERA
INADVERTENT OPERA
INADVERTENT OPERA
INADVERTENT OPERA
DELAYED OPERATION
DELAYED OPERATION
DELAYED OPERATION
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO REMAIN
FAILS TO REMAIN
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
SHORT (ELECTRICAL
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
SHORT (ELECTRICAL
SHORTED
SHORTED
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
SHORTED
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
SHORTED
SHORTED
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
SHORTED
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
FAILS TO ROTATE
SHORTS, PREMATURE
PHYSICAL BINDING
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NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
02-4G-184-I
05-6EG-2009-I
05-6EG-2017-I
02-4A-593201-1
02-4A-593203-I
02-4A-593205-2
02-4A-593301-2
02-4A-593301-I
16514
16515
16516
17121
17122
17123
17124
17125
ROLLER ASSEMBLY LATCH
FUSE, 1A
MID MCA I, 2, 3, 4
SIDE HATCH LATCH MECH
SIDE HATCH HINGE
SIDE HATCH ATTENUATOR
AIRLOCK HATCH LATCH M
AIRLOCK HATCH LATCH M
FAILS TO ENGAGE
FAIL OPEN
FAILS TO TRANSFER
FAILS TO DISENGAG
PHYSICAL BINDING
PHYSICAL BINDING
FAILS TO ENGAGE
FAILS TO DISENGAG
D-14
APPENDIX E
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA87001-
03, Analysis of the Mechanical Actuation System, (30 November
1987). Prior results were obtained independently and documented
before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental
analysis was performed to address failure modes not previously
considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item
being analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in NSTS 22206, Instructions $or Preparation of FMEA and
CIL, i0 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at
the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/16/88
MECH/PH
17121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: i/i
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SIDE HATCH LATCH MECHANISM
FAILS TO DISENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
SIDE HATCH
LATCH MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
V070-593201
CAUSES: FOREIGN OBJECTS/DEBRIS, PHYSICAL BINDING JAMMING, PIECE-
PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION DURING PRELAUNCH EMERGENCY EGRESS
OR ON-ORBIT IF EMERGENCY CREWMEMBER INGRESS IS REQUIRED. THIS
ITEM NOT IDENTIFIED SEPARATELY IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-2
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/16/88
MECH/PH
17122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 1/1
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SIDE HATCH HINGE
PHYSICAL BINDING JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
SIDE HATCH
HATCH HINGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: I/i RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: i/I AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: V070-593202
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, FOREIGN OBJECTS/DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION/CREW DUE TO LOSS OF INGRESS CAPABILITY
DURING PRELAUNCH EMERGENCY. NOT INCLUDED AS A SEPARATE ITEM IN
IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/16/88
MECH/PH
17123
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: i/i
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SIDE HATCH ATTENUATOR HINGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H. J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
SIDE HATCH ATTENUATOR ASSY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: i/i RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: I/I AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: MC252-0002-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, FOREIGN OBJECTS/DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION/CREW DUE TO LOSS OF INGRESS CAPABILITY
DURING ON-ORBIT EMERGENCY OR EGRESS CAPABILITY DURING PRELAUNCH
EMERGENCY. NOT INCLUDED AS A SEPARATE ITEM IN THE IOA DATA DROP
2.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/16/88
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 17125
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: /
ITEM: AIRLOCK HATCH LATCH MECHANISM
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO DISENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST : M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
AIRLOCK
HATCH LATCH MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: V075-593301
CAUSES: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM EVA
MISSIONS BECAUSE HATCHES CANNOT BE OPENED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-5
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/16/88
MECH/PH
17124
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: i/i
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AIRLOCK HATCH LATCH MECHANISM
FAILS TO ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
AIRLOCK
LATCH MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: V075-593301
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, FOREIGN OBJECTS/DEBRIS, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE AND SEAL
HATCH B PREVENTING AIRLOCK REPRESSURIZATION. NOT INCLUDED AS A
SEPARATE ITEM IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/16/88
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 17126
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: /
ITEM: AIRLOCK HATCH LATCH LOCK
FAILURE MODE: FAILS UNLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
AIRLOCK
HATCH LATCH MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
V075-593301
CAUSES: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM EVA
MISSIONS BECAUSE HATCHES CANNOT BE OPENED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-7
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/25/88
MECH/PBR
16513
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PBR
DEPLOYMENT
LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: V070-594410
CAUSES: ADVERSE TOLERANCES/WEAR, CONTAMINATION/FOREIGN
OBJECT/DEBRIS, DEFECTIVE PART/MATERIAL DEFECT, THERMAL
DISTORTION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE IF RADIATOR CANNOT BE STOWED.
HDW/FUNC
1/1
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-8
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/25/88
MECH/PBR
16511
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/iS
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BEARING, TORQUE SHAFT SUPPORT
FAILS TO ROTATE
LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PBR
TORQUE SHAFT
BEARING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME131-0051-0009
CAUSES: ADVERSE TOLERANCES/WEAR, CONTAMINATION/FOREIGN OBJECT
DEBRIS, SEIZED BEARING, TEMPERATURE, MISALIGNMENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW IF RADIATOR CANNOT BE STOWED AND
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-9
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/25/88
MECH/PBR
16514
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ROLLER ASSEMBLY LATCH RADIATOR
FAILS TO ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PBR
DEPLOYMENT
ROLLER ASSEMBLY LATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC203-0002-0012, 19, 32, 39
C [ P ]
CAUSES: ADVERSE TOLERANCES WEAR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-10
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/25/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 2/IR
16512 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH MODULE, LIMIT, RADIATOR STOWED
SHORTS, PREMATURELY CLOSES, CONDUCTS INADVERTENTLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PBR
RADIATOR
SWITCH, LIMIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME452-0123-0003
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE MAY PREVENT STOWAGE OF RADIATORS RESULTING IN IN
ABILITY TO CLOSE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-11
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/28/88
MECH/ADP/EPD C
11700
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE (IA) MOTOR POWER CONTROL
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA PROBE
PROBE ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/IR
/ TAL: 3/IR
/ AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: /
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT AIR DATA PROBE MOTOR. SECOND LOSS WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF PROBE CONTROL. NOT IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO DATA DROP
2.
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/28/88
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
11701
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA PROBE
SWITCH SCAN - LIMIT RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON PROBE OPERATION.
2.
NOT IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO DATA DROP
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/29/8s
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
11702
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA PROBE
LIMIT SWITCH - LIMIT RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT IN AIR DATA PROBE OPERATION.
DATA DROP 2.
NOT IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/29/88
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
11703
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT - DEPLOY SWITCH OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER LOSS OF OTHER REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT HARDWARE. NOT FOUND PRIOR TO DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/29/88
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
11704
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
SHORT (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT - DEPLOY SWITCH OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE UPON LOSS OF OTHER ADDITIONAL
REDUNDANT CIRCUIT HARDWARE. NOT IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-16
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/oi/88
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
11705
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
SHORT (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA PROBE
3) DEPLOY/HEAT - DEPLOY SWITCH SCAN
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
c [ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON AIR DATA PROBE OPERATION.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/Ol/88
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
11706
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT - DEPLOY SWITCH SCAN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE UPON LOSS OF OTHER, ADDITIONAL
REDUNDANT HARDWARE IN THE CIRCUIT. NOT IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO DATA
DROP 2.
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/02/88
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
11707
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA PROBE
3) HEATER CONTROL
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] c[P]
LOCATION: HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE UPON LOSS OF OTHER, ADDITIONAL
HARDWARE IN THE CIRCUIT. NOT IDENTIFIED IN DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/02/88
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
11708
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
SHORT (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA PROBE
HEATER CONTROL
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/1R ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE UPON LOSS OF OTHER ADDITIONAL
HARDWARE IN THE CIRCUIT. NOT IDENTIFIED IN DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-20
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/2s/88
MECH/PBR
16515
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PBR
3) FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME451-009-I001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT - FIRST FAILURE - POSSIBLE VEHICLE LOSS AFTER SECOND
FAILURE AND INABILITY TO STOW RADIATORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/25/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 16516 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: MID MCA i, 2, 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAILS TO CONDUCT, SHORTS TO
GROUND (DC SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PBR
MID MCA i, 2, 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME455-0135-0001, -0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURA FAILURE, VIBRATION,
THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS IF VEHICLE/CREW AFTER SECOND FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-22
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/os/88
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14688
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE (DEPLOY CONTROL)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DEPLOY CONTROL CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: THERMAL, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. ADDITIONAL FAILURES COULD CAUSE INADVERTENT
DEPLOY OF THE KU-BAND ANTENNA, DAMAGING ORBITER PLB
DOORS/RADIATORS. ITEM NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/os/88
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14689
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE (STOW ENABLE CIRCUIT)
SHORTED
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
BOOM STOW ENABLE (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID MCA2 & 4
JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: THERMAL, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT AFTER FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN
CONJUCTION COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CLOSE PLB DOORS WHEN ANTENNA IS DEPLOYED. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA
DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-24
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/08/88
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14690
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (STOW SIGNAL)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
STOW SIGNAL CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID MCA2 & 4
RWRSOSI211FR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN
CONJUNCTION COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CLOSE PLB DOORS. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-25
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/o8/s8
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14691
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM: RESISTOR (STOW SIGNAL)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
STOW SIGNAL CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB
DOORS. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-26
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/o8/88
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14692
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM: RESISTOR (STOW ENABLE SIGNAL)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
STOW ENABLE CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB
DOORS. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-27
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/09/88
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14693
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR (STOW ENABLE SIGNAL)
SHORTED
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BRFAtKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
STOW ENABLE CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
B [ F ] C [ P 3
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB
DOORS. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-28
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/09/88
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14694
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE (DEPLOY POS. INDICATION)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DEPLOY POSITION INDICATOR CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID MCA2 & 4
JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE
INADVERTENT/PREMATURE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA, DAMAGING ORBITER
STRUCTURE. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/09/88
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14695
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM: DIODE (DEPLOYED/XMIT SCAN ENABLE)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DEPLOY/XMIT SCAN ENABLE CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID MCA2 & 4
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN
CONJUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP
2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-30
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/09/88
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14696
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE (DEPLOYED/XMIT SCAN ENABLE)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DEPLOY/XMIT SCAN ENABLE CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID MCA2 & 4
JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN
CONJUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP
2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/lO/88
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14697
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM: FUSE (DEPLOY/XMIT SCAN ENABLE)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DEPLOY INDICATION/XMIT SCAN ENABLE CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0200
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN
CONJUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO PROVIDE STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY. NOT
IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/1o/88
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14698
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE (STOW INITIATE)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
STOW INITIATE CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID MCA2 & 4
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB
DOORS WITHOUT CAUSING STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO DOORS. NOT INCLUDED
IN THE IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/10/88
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14699
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE (STOW INITIATE)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
STOW INITIATE CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I001
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO CLOSE
PLB DOORS WITHOUT STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO THE DOORS. NOT INCLUDED
IN THE IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-34
APPENDZX F
NP, BA FHEA TO ZOA WORKSHEET CR088 REFERENCE/RECONNENDATION8
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
Appendix F Legend
Code Definition
None.
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MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY-
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